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Abstract: Murray Smith’s Film, Art, and the Third Culture makes a signiﬁ cant 
contribution to cognitive ﬁ lm theory and philosophical aesthetics, expand-
ing the conceptual tools of ﬁ lm analysis to include perspectives from neuro-
science and evolutionary psychology. Smith probes assumptions about how 
cinema affects spectators by examining aspects of experience and neurophys-
iological responses that are unavailable to conscious, systematic reﬂ ection on 
experience and aesthetic techniques. This article interrogates Smith’s account 
of emotion, empathy, and imagination in cinematic representation and ﬁ lm 
spectatorship, placing his work in dialogue with other recent interventions in 
the ﬁ elds of cinema studies and embodied cognition. Smith’s contribution to 
understanding the role of emotion in screen studies is vital, and when read in 
conjunction with recent publications by Carl Plantinga and Mark Johnson on 
ethical engagement and the moral imagination, this new work constitutes a 
notable advance in ﬁ lm theory.
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The ﬁ nal page of Murray Smith’s Film, Art, and the Third Culture concludes with 
a discussion of the gap between the mind, mental representations, mediated 
representations such as ﬁ lm footage, and the world that such representations 
depict: “Mind the gap,” Smith quips, borrowing the words of philosopher Jerry 
Fodor (2017: 223). Throughout the book, Smith turns his mind to this gap and 
to the gap between the arts and the sciences, arguing that imaginative, in-
ternal representational capacities of the mind and visual prostheses such as 
cameras that technologically mediate external representations are tools that 
enable us to grasp and make sense of the world. Smith’s thought-provoking 
book establishes an integrated research approach that he refers to as a nat-
uralized aesthetics of ﬁ lm, which sees cinema as a technocultural product of 
fundamental human capacities related to perception, cognition, and emotion. 
Taking a biocultural approach that examines the interrelationship between 
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biological capacities and their cultural elaboration, he demonstrates that both 
scientiﬁ c and humanistic perspectives have roles to play in illuminating artis-
tic creativity and aesthetic experience (2017: 10).
Film, Art, and the Third Culture: A Naturalized Aesthetics of Film joins Carl 
Plantinga’s Screen Stories: Emotion and the Ethics of Engagement (2018) and 
Mark Johnson’s The Aesthetics of Meaning and Thought: The Bodily Roots of 
Philosophy, Science, Morality, and Art (2018) in the latest wave of cognitivist 
research concerned with ﬁ lm and art. Such research demonstrates that neu-
roscientiﬁ c measures and imaging techniques offer new forms of insight into 
the audience’s experience of ﬁ lm that extend and supplement traditional 
methods of critical reﬂ ection, reception studies, and ﬁ lm analysis.
This article focuses on Part 2 of Smith’s book, “Science and Sentiment,” 
which builds on his earlier work, Engaging Characters (1995), to study emo-
tional engagement with cinema and to analyze the representation and ex-
pression of emotion in ﬁ lm. My particular interest is in the account Smith 
advances of the nature of emotion and its role in relation to empathy and 
imagination in the ﬁ lm experience. As Smith contends, quantitative empirical 
research adds scientiﬁ c evidence and methods to the qualitative, experien-
tial evidence marshalled by the ﬁ lmgoing public and humanities researchers. 
Neuroscientiﬁ c studies can provide evidence to support or critique conceptual 
assumptions about cinema spectatorship and empathy by using medical im-
aging techniques and neurophysiological measures to transcend “the limits 
of ordinary human perception” in order to examine aspects of empathy and 
ﬁ lm that are unavailable to conscious experience, reﬂ ection, or textual analy-
sis (Smith 2017: 103). Rather than succumbing to the idea that neuroscientiﬁ c 
methods can demystify the mind and thus explain aesthetic experience and 
responses to ﬁ lm, Smith argues for “triangulating” or cross-checking the phe-
nomenological experience of ﬁ lm with psychological and neural evidence by 
using three interrelated levels of analysis to understand mental phenomena 
(2017: 11). In particular, in his chapters “Triangulating Aesthetic Experience” and 
“The Engine of Reason and the Pit of Naturalism,” Smith argues persuasively 
that “neural evidence sheds light on the functional nuances of the phenom-
ena that elude ordinary experience and reﬂ ection” (2017: 103). Starting with 
emotion and moving on to empathy and then imagination, I will map out and 
critically engage with Smith’s naturalized aesthetics of ﬁ lm.
Emotion
In a book that delights in abstruse titles and subheadings such as “Feeling 
Pruﬁ sh” and “Normative Panting,” it is refreshing to ﬁ nd systematic expla-
nations and clear deﬁ nitions of complex concepts and processes. Smith pre-
sents a compelling argument that emotions have evolved through natural 
selection to provide humans with an evolutionary advantage. Recognition of 
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emotional facial expressions, he writes, provides “reliable information about 
the inner states of others” and this facilitates imaginative predictions of be-
havior within social contexts or narrative scenarios (2017: 142). Emotions can 
thus play a motivational role in guiding actions and responses to others, 
and they can function as intensiﬁ ers or “signal boosters” in the processes of 
decision-making (130).
From Smith’s biocultural perspective, an emotion is an embodied appraisal, 
that is, “a dynamic somatic and cognitive apprehension of the signiﬁ cance of 
some phenomena – an object, a person, an event, a situation – by an agent” 
(162). By contrast, Carl Plantinga uses the related but somewhat more awkward 
term concern-based construals to indicate that emotions can be understood 
as components of cognitive activities such as critique, inference, and recon-
sideration. “Emotions are intentional states, but they are embodied and thus 
accompanied by physiological disturbances, feelings, and action tendencies. 
Emotions may result from prior thought and perception, and they result in 
subsequent thought and perception” (2018: 113), Plantinga writes. For Smith 
and Plantinga alike, the embodied, felt nature of emotion is central to its role 
in cognition and deliberation. As Charles Darwin points out in The Expression 
of the Emotions in Man and Animals, “most of our emotions are so closely con-
nected with their expression, that they hardly exist if the body remains pas-
sive”; for instance, a person may be consumed by angry thoughts, “but until his 
bodily frame is affected he cannot be said to be enraged” (qtd in Smith 2017: 
134). The cinematic display of emotion, magniﬁ ed on the big screen, thereby 
serves important cultural functions. Smith sees cultural artforms such as 
narrative cinema as coaching audiences in the interpretation of emotion and 
schooling us in the forms of imaginative engagement and emotional literacy 
upon which altruistic interaction and social coherence rely. Fostering empathy 
is an important aspect of this function.
Empathy
While empathy is not an emotion in its own right, it serves as a form of af-
fective mapping, just as emotions furnish us with a map of values, valences, 
harms, and beneﬁ ts (Smith 2017: 179). Smith deﬁ nes empathy as “a term which 
is used to refer to a variety of phenomena, ranging from the conscious, imagi-
native effort to ‘perspective take’ or put oneself in another’s shoes, to affective 
mimicry and emotional contagion, whereby we ‘catch’ the emotions of others 
through a process of low-level, non-conscious, involuntary mimicry” (2017: 99). 
He presents an account of the role of empathy in character engagement from 
a cognitivist-philosophical perspective, taking into account recent research 
about neural mirroring and empathic simulation in neuroscience and drawing 
distinctions between intentional, cognitive mindreading and involuntary, neu-
robiological processes that he refers to as mindfeeling (194). Both capacities 
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are integral to the social nature of human life and to the way we make sense 
of the world (99). Indeed, as Plantinga puts it, cognition itself is not limited to 
mental activity; it is “suffused with affect” (2018: 113).
As an audiovisual medium of narrative communication, ﬁ lm both rep-
resents and elicits the emotional and empathic exchanges that are central to 
human relationships and to ethical understanding. The stylistic and techno-
logical audiovisual strategies by which ﬁ lm creates an aesthetic experience 
for its audience can also reproduce a screen protagonist’s perceptual experi-
ence, thereby stimulating both the imaginative and affective components of 
empathy. Neural mirroring or mimicry of another person’s emotional state via 
facial feedback or by experiencing emotional contagion may not properly be 
considered empathy in isolation because such involuntary affective states are 
experienced as one’s own feelings rather than being intentional and other-
oriented. However, Smith argues convincingly that these affective processes 
interrelate and that “mindfeeling” can extend the ability to attune ourselves to 
others and grasp their emotional states as we then consciously engage in the 
process of what he terms personal or central imagining (2017: 101). As Smith 
explains, neurobiological mirroring processes can “‘wire’ us into each other,” 
enabling a “direct, experiential form of understanding” of other people’s (or 
ﬁ lm characters’) actions and emotions (100). In terms of the aforementioned 
triangulation of perspectives, the mirror neuron system “is the neural sub-
strate that ‘implements’ our psychological capacities for sensory, motor, and 
affective mimicry, and the experiences that may characterize these processes” 
(99). 
Thus, by Smith’s account, emotions help us to understand ourselves and 
our world and empathic mirroring of others’ emotions constitutes “direct ex-
periential” knowledge through which we can feel in our own bodies how an-
other person feels (180). Clearly feeling, knowing, and imagining are not the 
same thing, but they each provide pathways to understanding. As Smith goes 
on to explain, involuntary bodily responses such as affective mimicry and emo-
tional contagion can prompt and support volitional cognitive acts of empathic 
simulation and imaginative activity: “Mimicry of basic actions and emotions 
may scaffold the imagination, including the empathic imagination, of more 
elaborate, ﬁ nely speciﬁ ed states of mind” (180). Detailing the interrelationship 
between feeling and thought in complex phenomena like the empathic imag-
ination is one of Smith’s greatest contributions to ﬁ lm theory.
Imagination
Dating back to his work in Engaging Characters, Smith has characterized em-
pathy as a type of imagining that he refers to as personal imagining or central 
imagining. Central imagining involves mentally projecting a possible scenario 
and imagining, perceiving, or experiencing that scenario in a way that en-
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ables a better understanding of those with whom we empathize. Importantly, 
Smith characterizes empathic imagining as “other-focussed personal imag-
ining – imagining the experiences of others ‘from the inside,’” stating that 
such imagining allows us to identify, understand, and directly apprehend the 
emotional moods and mindsets of others (2017: 179). However, unlike empathy, 
Smith does not deﬁ ne imagination with reference to philosophical or scientiﬁ c 
research. Instead, he considers the evolutionary advantage of cultural forms 
such as cinema that both spring from and give rise to imaginative activity.
An evolutionary advantage of ﬁ ction and narrative ﬁ lm may be that they 
hone the capacity to imagine: “One thing that sets us apart from other spe-
cies is our ability to ‘simulate’, in our minds, circumstances which we might 
encounter, or indeed which we have encountered in the past” (129). Using an 
uncharacteristically ﬂ amboyant analogy, Smith develops the notion that the 
way cognitive and reproductive systems work is based on evolutionary adap-
tations that advance the species, suggesting that “ﬁ ction is to the imagination 
as strawberry cheesecake is to fruit – a cultural elaboration of a biological ad-
aptation” (129). This suggests that imagination enriches foresight and the abil-
ity to plan, which in turn improves the chances of successful interaction with 
others and the environment. Furthermore, artistic representations of empathy 
scenarios, such as those found in narrative ﬁ lms, provide elaborate examples 
of imagining that may augment the reach, scale, and intensity of empathy 
(190–191). In a compelling passage about the power of ﬁ lm, Smith writes:
Our ability to empathise is extended across a wide range of types of 
person and situation, and sustained and intensiﬁ ed by virtue of the 
artiﬁ cial, “designed” environments created by narrative artefacts . . . 
The possibility of understanding “from the inside” – that is, empathi-
cally imagining the thoughts and feelings of – human agents in social 
situations more or less radically different from our own is disclosed. We 
may come not only to see, but to feel, how an agent in a given situation 
concludes that there are only a particular set of viable choices open to 
them. (191–192)
This gets to the heart of why emotional and empathic engagement with cin-
ema and other arts is signiﬁ cant and worth studying from both scientiﬁ c and 
humanistic perspectives. It is a topic that philosopher Mark Johnson takes up 
in relation to ethics, imagination, and the neural underpinnings of embodied 
cognition:
Moral imagination – both as our capacity to empathically under-
stand and feel with others and our ability to imagine how experience 
would play out under the shaping inﬂ uence of various values and 
choices – is thus dependent on our ability to simulate experiences. The 
“ M I N D  T H E  G A P ”  /  9 1
new approach known as “simulation semantics” has begun to explore 
experimentally how people understand experiences, visual scenes, and 
linguistic expressions by simulating, in their own neural and bodily sys-
tems, the perceptual experiences, motor programs, and affective valences 
that are involved in someone having those experiences. According to this 
perspective, conceptualization and reasoning are experiential simula-
tions. (2018: 172)
I have quoted Johnson’s work at length because of the central relevance of 
his research to that of both Smith and Plantinga, but also because with the 
increasing prominence of immersive technologies such as virtual reality I be-
lieve his assessment of the role of simulation in moral imagination is the next 
problem that cognitive media studies and those of us working at the inter-
section of ﬁ lm and philosophy need to tackle. Alongside Smith’s and Plantin-
ga’s work, Johnson’s model of ethical deliberation as a process of imaginative 
projection that works through “cognitive-conative-affective simulation” (2018: 
173) may provide the key to solving this problem.
Film as an Extension of Mind
In his chapter “Empathy, Expansionism and the Extended Mind,” Smith uses 
the theory of the “extended mind,” or the idea that cognition is not just located 
in the brain but is embodied and extends into the environment, to elucidate 
how empathy works in ﬁ lm narratives. Here, Johnson’s inﬂ uential account of 
how meaning arises from physical bodily engagement with the environment 
in Embodied Mind, Meaning, and Reason (2017) is pertinent. A former student 
of Paul Ricoeur, Johnson draws together insights from the phenomenological 
and hermeneutic traditions with those of cognitive science and the philoso-
phy of art. In The Aesthetics of Meaning and Thought (2018), Johnson’s account 
of the empathic imagination and the moral imagination in relation to art and 
narrative ﬁ ction is particularly relevant to Smith’s project. Johnson argues that 
the moral imagination depends on our ability to simulate experiences and 
that this ability is cultivated to a large extent through engagement with art 
(2018: 172). Building on the work of Martha Nussbaum (1990), among others, 
Johnson shows that “moral sensitivity requires us to be able to imagine the 
lives of others, and that narrative ﬁ ctions are one of the primary vehicles for 
such a process of empathic imagination” (2018: 166). The question remains 
how the imagination works with and through the technologically mediated 
experience of narrative cinema to foster empathic insight. It is a small step 
from here to considering the ways in which embodied engagement with 
the technologies and narratives of an artform such as cinema could be what 
Smith considers to be a form of extended mind.
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Extended mind theory proposes that “some part of the world is reliably 
coupled with the mind to form an integrated cognitive system; it is in this 
sense that the mind is extended into the world, structuring and co-opting part 
of it in order to augment its processing capabilities” (Smith 2017: 185). More 
particularly, Smith states that “when we empathize with another person we 
extend our mind to couple with part of her mind” and thereby learn some-
thing about her subjective circumstances by “co-opting” her perceptual and 
emotive capacities (188). But based on what we know about mirror neurons, 
embodied simulation entails an involuntary process of intercorporeality rather 
than extending one’s own mind to “co-opt” or “couple” with another person’s 
mind. Intercorporeality, according to Vittorio Gallese, is a kind of social intel-
ligence derived from the observation and neural mirroring of bodily actions, 
gestures, and expressions that enable affective, empathic understanding of 
other subjects’ agency and behavioral intentions (2016: 302). Cinematic nar-
ratives with emotive close-ups and images of the human body in action and 
interaction would therefore seem to provide an ideal laboratory for intercor-
poreal simulation.
Smith thinks of ﬁ lmmaking technologies such as cinematography and 
CGI as “cognitive prostheses,” just as technologies such as telescopes and 
microscopes act as “perceptual prostheses – devices that amplify our native 
perceptual capacities” (2017: 188). In this way, practices of representation and 
narration from childhood games of mimicry and make believe through to cin-
ematic technologies and virtual reality simulations can augment empathy 
by reinforcing and extending the imagination (188–189). Speciﬁ cally, Smith 
proposes that empathy can be enhanced by certain cognitive prostheses or 
mental extensions, and in such cases “it is the domain of representation, and 
especially the practice of narration, that constitutes the ‘environmental sup-
port’ created by the mind to drive its ampliﬁ ed performance” (188). If I under-
stand this correctly, then it may not be so much the case that when crafting 
or responding to ﬁ lm narratives the mind creates an environmental support 
that boosts its performance, but more simply that cinematic technologies can 
amplify perceptual attunement to others. With reference to the work of Pat-
rick Maynard, Smith argues that cinematographic technology is a “cognitive 
ampliﬁ er” that expands the capacity for visualization and imagination (187). 
In other words, the technologically mediated representations of narrative cin-
ema can focus and augment empathic attention via techniques such as vi-
sual and aural close-ups and the position-taking cadence of shot-reverse-shot 
editing.
Compare this to phenomenologist Vivian Sobchack’s account of herme-
neutic and embodiment relations with technology in Address of the Eye (1992: 
186–195), where she discusses different levels on which cinematic technol-
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ogy informs and extends perception and cognition. Sobchack details the way 
in which the cinema audience perceives through technology (as one sees 
through a clear lens) and perceives along with the technology (intersubjec-
tively perceiving what the camera “sees,” what the microphone “hears,” and 
what the projector “expresses,” as though these are the organs of the ﬁ lm’s 
own embodied subjectivity). In this account, the ﬁ lm along with its ﬁ lmmak-
ers and its audience can thus be conceptualized as an intersubjective en-
tity that is more like a cyborg than a prosthetic device that technologically 
extends human perception (1992: 163). In a passage that calls to mind 
Smith’s suggestion that ﬁ lm is a technological extension of mind that inte-
grates with and augments our cognitive system, Sobchack argues that ﬁ lm 
allows “for the extension of human intentionality” such that “the machine is 
incorporated into the human intentional act of perceiving the world, even as 
the machine enables a patently ‘impossible’ human perception, that is, one 
otherwise unrealizable without the machine’s incorporation” (Sobchack 1992: 
184).
Just as Sobchack is persuasive in her attention to different levels of technolog-
ically mediated phenomenological experience, Smith is persuasive in his call 
for taking the insights of cognitive science seriously. It is worth noting that 
Smith does not restrict his extended mind thesis to cinematic technologies 
and narratives; he also describes neuroscientiﬁ c tools as technologies that en-
able a form of “scientiﬁ c observation that transcends the limits of ordinary 
human perception; the brain scanner joins the telescope, the microscope, stop 
motion and x-ray, radar and sonar, and so on – all technologies which allow 
us to see (or otherwise detect) new aspects of our world, or to see familiar 
aspects of it in greater detail” (2017: 103).
To conclude, neither the concept of the extended mind nor that of the ﬁ lm’s 
body provides a completely convincing explanation of the ﬁ lm audience’s em-
bodied and imaginative extensions through cinematic technologies and nar-
ratives into other worlds in ways that forge empathic connections to others, 
but both perspectives open onto important avenues for further research. This 
means more genuinely interdisciplinary collaborative work is needed to un-
derstand how imagination and empathy work and how they may be affected 
by new technologies and aesthetic techniques. While it remains true that “sci-
entiﬁ c practice will never replace art as a vehicle of human expression and 
meaning-making; and neither will science provide the tools for discerning the 
‘embodied meanings’ of artworks” (Smith 2017: 220), Smith’s book brings to-
gether some of the best scholarship from both paradigms to help us consider 
aesthetic experience anew.
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